



Statutory guidance

Prevent duty guidance: for England and Wales (accessible)

Updated 6 March 2024

Section 1: Status and scope of the Prevent duty

Summary

About this guidance

1. This guidance replaces the ‘Revised Prevent duty guidance : for England and Wales’, the ‘Prevent duty guidance: for further education institutions in England and Wales’, and the ‘Prevent duty guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales’ of 2015 (updated in April 2021).
2. This guidance is addressed to specified authorities in England and Wales. Those specified authorities are listed in Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), being those to whom the Prevent duty under section 26 of the Act applies. This guidance does not concern specified authorities in Scotland, which are listed at Part 2 of the Schedule and are also subject to the Prevent duty.
3. The Prevent duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority. The term ‘due regard’ as used in the CTSA 2015 means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. The purpose of this guidance is to set out the

expectations for each of the main statutory sectors and describe the ways in which they should comply with the Prevent duty.

4. This guidance also includes sources of further advice to support best practice. There is separate guidance for specified authorities in Scotland.

5. We use the terms ‘must’ and ‘should’ throughout this guidance. We use the term ‘must’ when the specified authority is legally required to do something, and ‘should’ when the advice sets out expectations and good practice for complying with the Prevent duty.

Who is this guidance for?

6. This statutory guidance is intended for use by:

- senior leadership teams in any of the specified authorities listed in Part 1 of Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015
- those with dedicated Prevent and/or safeguarding responsibilities
- people in specified authorities with responsibility for how resources and funding are used, and for external partnerships
- those in a frontline role and likely to engage with people who may be susceptible to radicalisation

7. Specified authorities are the people, organisations and institutions listed in Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015 to whom the Prevent duty applies. It is their responsibility to consider this guidance in carrying out the Prevent duty.

8. The list of specified authorities subject to the provisions can be found in [Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015](#)^[footnote 1]. Further details are in the sector-specific sections of this guidance.

9. This guidance may also inform best practice for other sectors that are not specified authorities but may wish to consider how to prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism.

What is the status of this guidance?

10. This is statutory guidance from the Home Office, issued under Section 29 of the CTSA 2015.^[footnote 2] It comes into force on 31 December 2023.

11. The Prevent duty applies to specified authorities in England and Wales, and Scotland. While counter-terrorism is the responsibility of the UK government, many of

the local delivery mechanisms in Wales and Scotland, such as health, education and local government, are in devolved areas.

Section 2: Introduction

12. The overall aim of our counter-terrorism strategy, [CONTEST](#)^[footnote 3], is to reduce the risk from terrorism to the UK, its citizens and interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. Prevent remains one of the key pillars of CONTEST, alongside the other three 'P' work strands:

- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack
- Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

The Prevent duty

13. The aim of Prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Prevent also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism.

14. The Prevent duty requires specified authorities such as education, health, local authorities, police and criminal justice agencies (prisons and probation) to help prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It sits alongside long-established safeguarding duties on professionals to protect people from a range of other harms, such as substance abuse, involvement in gangs, and physical and sexual exploitation. The duty helps to ensure that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are supported as they would be under safeguarding processes.

15. In fulfilling the Prevent duty in Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. We acknowledge that how they do this in practice will vary depending on factors such as the local context and risk, the most appropriate type of Prevent activity for them to be involved in, and the nature of their primary responsibilities and functions. As an

example, for those who work directly with people who may be susceptible to radicalisation to terrorism, activity is most likely to be around identification and early intervention. Relevant factors may include relationships held with the person or the frequency of interaction.

16. When carrying out the Prevent duty, specified authorities should also ensure that they comply with other legal obligations, particularly those under data protection legislation and the Equality Act 2010 (for example, the Public Sector Equality Duty). Further education and higher education settings should be especially mindful of duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.

Prevent's objectives

17. The objectives of Prevent are to:

- tackle the ideological causes of terrorism
- intervene early to support people susceptible to radicalisation
- enable people who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate

Prevent delivery model

18. The Prevent delivery model (Tackling the ideological causes of terrorism, Early intervention, Rehabilitation) sets out how we tackle the ideological causes that lead to radicalisation, intervene early to support those who are susceptible to radicalisation, and rehabilitate those who have already engaged with terrorism.

19. To tackle the ideological causes of terrorism, Prevent focuses on reducing the influence of radicalisers on susceptible audiences, as well as reducing the availability of, and access to, terrorist content. Our work to counter radicalisation and reduce permissive environments extends across academia, civil society, communities, government and industry. Prevent takes a partnership approach to disrupting radicalisers, including those who sow division and hatred, by working with local, regional and national partners, law enforcement agencies, and other government partners.

20. Prevent intervenes early by identifying people who are susceptible to radicalisation and providing support to those suitable for intervention. Where the police assess a radicalisation risk following a Prevent referral, a Channel panel will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk and decide whether the person should be accepted into Channel. Once accepted, the panel agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. The panel is chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services. Channel is a voluntary process, and people must give their consent before they receive support. In cases where the person is under 18 years of age, consent is provided by a parent, guardian or the agency that has responsibility for their care. Where risks cannot be managed in Channel, they will be kept under review by the police.

21. Rehabilitation seeks to reduce the risk of people who have been involved in terrorist-related activity, including those who have been convicted of offences. The Desistance and Disengagement Programme provides specialist Home Office-approved intervention providers to give support in the form of theological, ideological and practical mentoring to reduce the offending risk.

Threat and risk

22. Prevent deals with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. Prevent's first objective is to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. The ideological component of terrorism is what sets it apart from other acts of serious violence. Islamist ideology is resilient and enduring. Extreme Right-Wing ideology is resurgent. Other ideologies are less present, but still have the potential to motivate, inspire and be used to justify terrorism.

23. In the UK, the primary domestic terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorism is the threat or use of violence as a means to establish a strict interpretation of an Islamic society. For some this is a political ideology which envisions, for example, the creation of a global Islamic caliphate based on strict implementation of shari'ah law, drawing on political and religious ideas developed in the 20th century by Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azzam. Many adherents believe that violence (or 'jihad' as they conceive it) is not only a necessary strategic tool to achieve their aims, but an individual's religious duty.

24. Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism describes those involved in Extreme Right-Wing activity who use terrorist violence to further their ideology. These ideologies can be broadly characterised as Cultural Nationalism, White Nationalism and White

Supremacism. Individuals and groups may subscribe to ideological trends and ideas from more than one category. Unlike Islamist terrorist groups, Extreme Right-Wing terrorists are not typically organised into formal groups with leadership hierarchies and territorial ambitions, but informal online communities which facilitate international links.

25. Prevent also tackles other ideologies and concerns that may pose a terrorist threat. Established terrorist narratives exhibit common themes such as antisemitism, misogyny, anti-establishment, anti-LGBT grievances and religious or ethnic superiority. Left-Wing, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism currently represents a significantly smaller terrorist threat to the UK than Islamist terrorism or Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism and is not currently present in the UK at any significant scale (although there has been some activity that has met a terrorism threshold in recent years). The majority of related activity in the UK has consisted of lawful protest, and where these have involved violence, it has resulted in offences relating to public order.

26. Conspiracy theories can act as gateways to radicalised thinking and sometimes violence. In some cases, a blurring of ideologies with personal narratives makes it harder to assess the risk that people may pose. The need to understand motivation and intent is why in some cases it can take time for an incident to be declared terrorism or not, and why sometimes it remains unclear.

27. Counter-terrorism efforts encounter a range of personal and ideological motivations to violence, where a traditional terrorist narrative may only be part of a much more complex picture. Terrorists can hold a range of personal grievances alongside the primary ideology for committing an attack. Individuals are increasingly adopting a mix of ideas from different ideologies into their grievance narratives. This contributes to the increasing challenge of assessing the motivation behind an individual's violence, determining the most appropriate mitigations to put in place and judging whether or not that violence constitutes an act of terrorism. It is possible that violent adherents to movements and subcultures, such as Involuntary Celibacy (Incels), could meet the threshold of terrorist intent or action, should the threat or use of serious violence be used to influence the government or intimidate the public. [\[footnote 4\]](#)

28. Prevent work should always be aware of the risk presented by the people or group in question and recognise the agency of people in aligning with extremist groups. Encouraging susceptible people to commit acts of terrorism on their own initiative is a deliberate strategy of terrorist groups in their propaganda and is exacerbated by communities who glorify acts of violence against society or specific groups within it.

29. There is rapid proliferation of terrorist content on multiple online services. Research has demonstrated that the internet has become the ‘preferred’ avenue for those searching for terrorist propaganda or contacts. The internet continues to make it simpler for individuals and groups to promote and to consume radicalising content. Government analysis of the Terrorism Act (TACT) offenders and TACT-related offenders’ radicalisation pathways in England and Wales found that online radicalisation had become the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of TACT offenders. [\[footnote 5\]](#) Previously, it had been a hybrid pathway, involving both online and offline influences. [\[footnote 6\]](#) This can involve people, including a concerning number of children under the age of 18, committing offences by downloading and disseminating terrorist materials.

30. Prevent continues to monitor emerging radicalisation trends and ideologies to establish whether they represent a terrorism risk or play a role in radicalising people. [Annual statistics on the people referred to Prevent, which includes a breakdown of ideology and type of concern, can be found on GOV.UK.](#) Information and analysis on extremist and terrorist ideologies is available from the [Commission for Countering Extremism](#), the government’s ‘centre of excellence’ on counter extremism.

Responding to the threat

Security Threat Checks

31. At strategic leadership level, to ensure that all Prevent delivery and activity is guided by the threat, decision making within the Home Office’s Homeland Security Group and Counter Terrorism Policing is informed by the Security Threat Check (STC). This is a series of principles as set out below:

- Is this action mindful of the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture?
- Is this action proportionate when placed against the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture?
- Is this action likely to reduce the threat of terrorism or terrorist-adjacent narratives?

32. While the STC is recommended for strategic Prevent boards in the Home Office’s Homeland Security Group and for Counter Terrorism Policing, local authorities should also conduct the STC when developing their Prevent partnership plans. Other strategic Prevent boards should consider whether these principles could be helpful to inform their decision making, such as when developing action plans in response to local risk assessments or [counter-terrorism local profiles](#) [\[footnote 7\]](#).

33. In fulfilling their responsibilities under the Prevent duty, specified authorities should ensure any decisions taken are proportionate to the risk of terrorism and radicalisation in their local area, sector or institution. Local delivery should be tailored to reflect and respond to local threats.

34. For practitioners, it is key that, when carrying out functions under the Prevent duty, they are mindful of the need for proportionality. A risk-based approach should always be followed, using professional judgement and curiosity. There should be one consistent and proportionate threshold applied to Prevent activity across all extremist ideologies and radicalisation concerns. Where frontline professionals have identified a concern that they consider requires a referral into Prevent, it is important that they can indicate why this risk is relevant to Prevent. As Prevent is a counter-terrorism capability, the presence, or possible presence, of any terrorist or terrorism-linked ideology will be an important consideration.

Susceptibility to radicalisation

35. Radicalisation is the process of a person legitimising support for, or use of, terrorist violence. Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause.

36. There is no single profile of a radicalised person, nor is there a single pathway or 'conveyor belt' to being radicalised. There are many factors which can, either alone or combined, lead someone to subscribe to terrorist or terrorism-supporting ideology. These factors often include exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances – often created or exacerbated through grievance narratives espoused by extremists – and a person's own susceptibility.

37. A person's susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to their vulnerability. [A person can be vulnerable](#) if they need special care, support or protection because of age, disability, risk of abuse or neglect^{[\[footnote 8\]](#)}. A person's vulnerabilities may be relevant to their susceptibility to radicalisation and to the early intervention approach that is required to divert them away from radicalisation.

38. In other cases, vulnerabilities may not be present or relevant to the early intervention approach required. Not all people susceptible to radicalisation will be vulnerable, and there are other circumstances, needs or other underlying factors that may make a person susceptible to radicalisation but do not constitute a vulnerability.

Early intervention: referral to Prevent

Referral

39. Prevent's second objective is to intervene early to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This means providing bespoke interventions for people who are susceptible to radicalisation.

40. Prevent referrals are likely to be made in the first instance by people who come into contact with those who appear to be at risk of being radicalised. There is no single model of a person's radicalisation journey or single profile of a radicalised person. Frontline professionals, when deciding whether to make a referral, should consider whether they believe the person they are concerned about may be on a pathway that could lead to terrorism.

41. Signs that extremist views are being adopted, including changes in behaviour that might signal a concern, can be used to consider whether a referral should be made to seek support under Prevent. In determining whether a concern meets the threshold for referral to Prevent, it is important to consider the harm posed to the person, as well as whether accessing support through Prevent might stop potential wider societal harm committed by the person.

42. The process will vary, but when a concern is identified, the [notice, check, share procedure](#) should be applied as outlined in the Prevent duty GOV.UK awareness course^[footnote 9] ^[footnote 10]. Specified authorities should use the Prevent [national referral form](#)^[footnote 11].

43. Often, the concern will be escalated to the organisation or institution's Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) or Prevent lead to check. If there is a concern about potential radicalisation or a reason to believe that someone is at risk of becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it, a referral should be made to police, who will assess whether the person is suitable to be considered by a Channel panel for support.

44. Anyone making a referral should ensure there is concern that someone may be susceptible to becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it. There may be times when the precise ideological driver is not clear. Yet, like any safeguarding mechanism, it is far better to receive referrals which turn out not to be of concern than for someone who genuinely needs support to be missed.

45. Providing feedback on referrals is not always possible to protect the confidentiality of the person referred once received by police.

46. If you are unsure whether a concern constitutes a Prevent referral, we encourage seeking advice from your DSL (or equivalent), local authority Prevent lead or police, in the first instance. Consideration should also be given to whether the person may be susceptible to radicalisation or may instead be more suitable for a different type of support or safeguarding referral.

47. Further guidance on making a referral and how to apply the notice, check, share procedure can be found by completing the [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#)^[footnote 12].

48. For members of the public who have concerns about someone being radicalised into terrorism or supporting terrorism, the [ACT Early](#) website offers advice and guidance, including signs of radicalisation to look out for, case studies and information on how to share those concerns^[footnote 13].

Gateway assessment

49. Once a referral is submitted to Prevent, it is assessed by specialist police officers and staff. These officers determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism and should therefore be considered by the Channel panel for support through Prevent. This is called a 'gateway assessment'. If other support mechanisms are simultaneously required or being considered, these should proceed unless there is a good reason not to do so.

50. The police officers and staff who are assessing whether a referral should progress through to Channel will draw on robust decision-making frameworks to determine whether a referral meets the threshold for Prevent, and to ensure that a consistent threshold is applied. This includes, but is not limited to:

- determining the presence of an ideological driver
- determining what harm may be caused by the person (or could be caused to the person being referred)
- considering factors such as a person's agency, as well as any predisposition to exploitation

51. Those making an assessment will use a combination of frameworks, guidance and professional judgement to ensure there is no disparity in the threshold for making a referral dependent on ideology. Ensuring that specialist police officers and staff

assessing referrals have appropriate training, including on ideology, will help to ensure consistent decision making.

Channel

52. The gateway assessment should determine the most appropriate forum to discuss the referral. Those who are appropriate for consideration at Channel are subject to a further, more detailed Prevent assessment led by the Channel case officer. This assessment is informed by information sharing with wider Channel partners.

53. Once the gateway assessment and multi-agency information gathering is complete, where appropriate, and where the Channel panel agrees, the person may be adopted into Channel and receive tailored support to reduce their susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism.

Channel is a multi-agency programme across England and Wales that provides support to people susceptible to becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, underpinned by Section 36 of the CTSA 2015. The person (or their parent or legal guardian, if under 18) referred to it must give consent before any support can be provided under Channel. [Further information on Channel is available on GOV.UK^{\[footnote 14\]}](#).

54. Channel panels are chaired by the local authority, and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services. They will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk, and, if appropriate, agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. Channel is a voluntary process, and the person must give their consent (or, where appropriate, their parent's or guardian's consent should be obtained) before they receive support.

55. Where Channel is not considered suitable, alternative options will be explored where appropriate. The person may be offered alternative support, such as by mental health services or children's social care services. Where consent for Channel has not been given or the level of risk posed makes it unsuitable, the person can be considered for Police-led Partnerships. Police-led Partnerships cover the management of people, groups or institutions that are not suitable for Channel, but which have identified Prevent-relevant issues requiring support or mitigation. Police-led Partnerships are led by police but work in partnership with other agencies and employ many of the same type of approaches used within the multi-agency processes of Channel.

56. [Further details on referrals can be found on GOV.UK](#), and there may also be guidance specific to your sector^{[\[footnote 15\]](#)}.

Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty

57. Compliance with the Prevent duty will look different across each specified authority, due to their different functions, structures and remits.

58. The risk of radicalisation will vary greatly, but no area, institution or body is risk free. All statutory partners will therefore need to consider the risk within their area, institution or body, and consider the type and scale of activity that is appropriate to address it.

59. This guidance sets out the expectations, requirements and recommendations for activity within each statutory sector, grouped into the following themes:

- leadership and partnership
- capabilities
- reducing permissive environments

60. By following this guidance, specified authorities will be well placed to comply with the Prevent duty.

61. The guidance also sets out monitoring and assurance arrangements for each sector.

Leadership and partnership

62. Specified authorities should develop and maintain appropriate leadership and partnership working to help them have due regard to the need to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Leadership

63. Within each specified authority there should be a designated person in a leadership position who is responsible for overseeing Prevent delivery, including ensuring that relevant staff have appropriate training and induction. How Prevent is delivered within each service, institution or body will vary. For example, some specified authorities may use dedicated Prevent roles, whereas others may deliver Prevent through wider safeguarding duties.

64. For all specified authorities, leadership in delivering Prevent should be demonstrated by:

- ensuring staff understand the risk of radicalisation that results in support for terrorism or involvement in terrorism by making sure they can access training resources and further guidance
- building and promoting the capabilities to deal with radicalisation concerns, such as a formal pathway to escalate concerns and refer through to Prevent
- promoting the importance of Prevent and the role staff play in countering terrorism

Partnership working

65. Effective partnership is a key component of delivering Prevent. To demonstrate compliance with the duty, specified authorities should work with local Prevent leads, the police and local authorities. This should be facilitated through multi-agency forums, such as local, regional or national strategic Prevent boards.

66. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, specified authorities must co-operate as reasonably practicable with local authority-led Channel panels, in accordance with Section 38 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015). Further details are outlined in the [Channel duty guidance](#)^[footnote 16]. Multi-agency involvement in Channel is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

Capabilities

67. Specified authorities should develop and maintain appropriate capabilities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being radicalised into terrorism. They will be well placed to do so by having capabilities for:

- understanding risk
- managing risk

- sharing information

Understanding risk

Training and induction

68. It is important that specified authorities know why radicalisation is relevant to their setting and how it may present. As a starting point, all specified authorities should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation by ensuring and recording that appropriate staff undertake training, particularly on radicalisation. By understanding the risk, as well as how to raise a concern, those under the Prevent duty play a role in ensuring that people who are at risk of being radicalised can have their views challenged where appropriate, receive suitable support and be diverted away from terrorism.

69. People with responsibility for Prevent within a specified authority should ensure that relevant staff have appropriate training on Prevent.

70. We anticipate that appropriate training may differ depending on a person's role. This guidance makes sector-specific recommendations, and specified authorities should ensure they undertake any training required for their sector at the earliest opportunity to ensure they are adequately equipped for their role. The frequency and type of training required may depend on factors such as the local context and risk, or the nature of their responsibilities and functions, and should be determined by an organisational assessment of training needs.

Radicalisation is a personal and individual process, which will look different from person to person. When talking about the 'risk of radicalisation', it is therefore challenging to describe exactly what it looks like. Various signs or indicators may signal a person is at risk of being radicalised into terrorism.

There are resources and guides that specified authorities can access to improve their understanding and awareness of radicalisation. The Home Office's Prevent page on GOV.UK sets out in further detail how to spot the signs of radicalisation and [what to do if you are concerned about someone](#).^[footnote 17] This is supported by the [Prevent duty training, also on GOV.UK](#).^[footnote 18] Each specified authority may also provide their own supplementary training and guidance.

71. Staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be susceptible to extremist ideologies used to encourage people into

participating in or supporting terrorism. They should be aware of the terms ‘radicalisation’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’.

72. Staff should know what measures are available to prevent radicalisation into terrorism and how to recognise the extremist ideologies that drive people to become terrorists or support terrorism. Staff should have awareness of the signs of radicalisation and should understand how to escalate and refer concerns to Prevent. In some cases, this may mean contacting their Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL) or equivalent, who would then be able to assist with referring onwards to Prevent, either by contacting the police or local authority.

73. Those with Prevent-specific responsibilities, such as DSLs, are likely to require additional, more regular training so they can support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues.

74. The Home Office offers free [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) to support those under the duty^[footnote 19]. Other support, including face-to-face training, may be available. We expect all frontline staff working for specified authorities to have reasonable and appropriate understanding of extremist and terrorist ideologies, and training should be provided on this.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

75. As well as ensuring that staff are appropriately trained, specified authorities should understand their risks regarding radicalisation. Conducting a risk assessment will help to build understanding of national, regional and local risks, and will help to tailor approaches and manage risk accordingly. Engaging with partners will help to build understanding of the threats and risks. It may be appropriate to include risks around radicalisation as part of broader organisation risk assessments.

76. Specified authorities should have proportionate and appropriate capabilities to manage risk. This should include having a clear approach to deal with radicalisation concerns, which is outlined either within existing policies or a separate Prevent-specific policy. It should also include processes to advise how concerns should be handled, including who should be contacted within an organisation. The Prevent [national referral form](#) should be used when making referrals.^[footnote 20]

Sharing information

77. Specified authorities may need to share information about people to ensure, for example, that a person at risk of radicalisation is given appropriate support, such as on

the Channel programme. When sharing personal data, specified authorities must comply with the requirements of data protection legislation as it applies to them.

78. It is important to remember that data protection legislation is not intended to prevent the sharing of personal data, but to ensure that it is done lawfully and with appropriate safeguards in place. While information-sharing should be considered on a case-by-case basis, it may be good practice in some circumstances – for example, where there is routine sharing – to have an information-sharing agreement in place.

79. The Information Commissioner's Office [provides advice on the requirements of the data protection legislation for organisations](#).^[footnote 21] There may be some circumstances where specified authorities, in the course of Prevent-related work, identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorist-related activity. If someone is suspected of being involved in such activity, the police should be informed immediately.

80. [Further advice on information sharing can be found on GOV.UK](#).^[footnote 22]

Reducing permissive environments

81. One way that Prevent seeks to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism is by limiting exposure to radicalising narratives, both online and offline, and to create an environment where radicalising ideologies are challenged and are not permitted to flourish.

82. Radicalisers create and take advantage of permissive environments to promote or condone violence and to spread poisonous ideologies that undermine our values and society. When considering how to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism, it is also important to consider how radicalisers use extremist ideas and narratives to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. This includes in instances where the exact ideology is unclear. Established terrorist narratives exhibit common themes such as antisemitism, misogyny, anti-establishment, anti-LGBT grievances and religious or ethnic superiority. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives.^[footnote 23]

83. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content reasonably linked to terrorism, can help to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This includes limiting the use of permissive online environments or other platforms, which can contribute to radicalisation by

facilitating exposure to terrorist and extremist content, and enabling networking with like-minded people.

84. Encouragement of terrorism, including glorifying the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism, fundraising for the purposes of terrorism, and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, are all criminal offences. Specified authorities should not provide a platform for an offence to be committed, or facilitate this activity through provision of endorsement, funding or other forms of support.

85. It is important for specified authorities to identify and consider opportunities to disrupt those who seek to radicalise others into conducting terrorism-related activity or supporting terrorism, or who perpetuate extremist ideologies linked to terrorism. This may mean having policies in place that, where appropriate, limit radicalising influences (including online), or ensure that facilities are not used inappropriately. It could mean challenging extremist ideas often linked to terrorism or a terrorist ideology, some of which may encompass more broadly harmful ideas, such as misogyny and antisemitism, or the concept of blasphemy to justify or condone violence.

86. It is also important that Prevent funding does not go to organisations or people whose views create an environment in which terrorism is encouraged or supported. Specified authorities should consider whether there are risks involved in their work with particular groups or individuals, such as providing legitimacy to terrorist-linked organisations or potentially damaging their reputation for making Prevent referrals. Specified authorities should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and should ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken. Additionally, when seeking advice on the Prevent duty from external parties, specified authorities should be aware that some people or organisations might actively promote non-compliance with the Prevent duty and so specified authorities should take appropriate steps.

87. Any actions taken to reduce the permissive space for radicalisation should be proportionate, lawful and appropriate. Specified authorities should consider any relevant guidance issued to their sector, as well as their corresponding section of this guidance, to help understand sector-specific considerations.

Section 4: Monitoring and assurance

88. All specified authorities must comply with the duty under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015). To ensure consistency and proportionate delivery, each authority should maintain appropriate records to show compliance with the Prevent duty. This should include keeping track of any Prevent training being undertaken by staff. Specified authorities should consider their record-keeping arrangements for Prevent referrals to ensure they are proportionate and appropriate, while also being mindful of requirements under data protection legislation (for example, the principle of storage limitation).

89. Monitoring and assurance will be supported by existing assurance processes in specific sectors. These are detailed under each sector-specific section.

90. Implementation of the Prevent duty is subject to cross-government ministerial oversight. The Home Office works closely with other government departments, devolved governments and Counter Terrorism Policing to maintain oversight of Prevent delivery. Counter Terrorism Policing handle all Prevent referrals, assessing them for risk and appropriateness for Prevent support.

91. Where Prevent activity has fallen short of the standards set out in this guidance, practitioners and the public may raise concerns through an independent complaints function. [\[footnote 24\]](#) Ministers also have the power to instruct investigations through this function, including in the event of a reported failure of statutory partners to uphold the Prevent duty. This function is complementary to existing sector-specific assurance and complaints processes (as detailed in each sector-specific section). The findings will be anonymised and published on GOV.UK

92. Where a specified body is not complying with the duty, the Secretary of State may use the power of direction under Section 30 of the CTSA 2015 to give directions. These directions may be enforced by court order.

Central support and monitoring

93. The Home Office oversees Prevent activity in all local areas and may award funding to support delivery.

94. The Home Office will:

- draw together data about implementation of Prevent from local and regional Prevent leads (including those in safeguarding roles with Prevent duties in health and

education), the police, intelligence agencies, and other departments and inspection bodies where appropriate

- monitor and assess Prevent delivery in all local areas
- set the overall direction for Prevent policy and delivery across relevant government departments and specified partners
- uphold governance mechanisms overseeing the implementation of Prevent
- guide strategic decision making by conducting a [Security Threat Check](#)

Section 5: Sector-specific guidance

95. This section contains guidance specific to:

- [local authorities](#)
- [education](#)
- [healthcare](#)
- [police](#)
- criminal justice agencies ([prisons and probation](#))

Local authorities

96. With their wide-ranging responsibilities and democratic accountability to their electorate, local authorities are vital to Prevent work. Effective local authorities should work with their local partners to protect the public, prevent crime and promote strong, integrated communities.

97. All local authorities have a legal duty to deliver Prevent in their area. Each year, to ensure Prevent activity and resource are focused on the areas of highest threat, the Home Office undertakes a prioritisation exercise to review the relative threat from terrorism across the country. This determines where in the country the threat from radicalisation is highest. In those areas, additional funding may be allocated to support the local authority in fulfilling the Prevent duty.

98. Areas receiving additional funding will have a Prevent team which includes a Prevent co-ordinator, supported by additional staff as required. Areas which do not receive dedicated Prevent funding should have a Prevent lead embedded in a relevant team within the local authority that carries out similar functions. A network of Home Office advisers is responsible for engaging with and supporting all local authorities to deliver against the Prevent duty.

99. Further guidance can be found in the [Prevent duty toolkit for local authorities](#) .
[footnote 25] The toolkit is designed to provide practical information and examples of good practice to support local authorities and their partners in their work to protect people from radicalisation.

Specified local authorities

100. The local authorities that are subject to the Prevent duty are listed in [Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(CTSA 2015\)](#).
[footnote 26] They are:

- a county council or district council in England
- Single Tier Unitary Authority
- the Greater London Authority
- a London borough council
- the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority
- the Council of the Isles of Scilly
- a county council or county borough council in Wales
- a person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in Section 1 (2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under Section 15 of that act

101. Where local authorities have sub-contracted a service, we expect robust procedures to be in place to ensure that, wherever appropriate, the sub-contractor is aware of the Prevent duty and the sub-contractor is not inadvertently funding extremist organisations. Services may include children and adult social care.

102. Other authorities, including stand-alone fire and rescue authorities, are not listed in the CTSA 2015 and are not subject to the Prevent duty. However, considering their

wider prevention role, in many areas they are partners in local efforts to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

103. In fulfilling the Prevent duty, local authorities, including elected members and senior officers, should be carrying out activity in the following areas.

Leadership and partnership

104. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Leadership and partnership](#).

105. Leaders in local authorities are vital to promoting the importance of Prevent and ensuring that the risks of radicalisation to terrorism are understood and managed. They should ensure that appropriate capabilities are in place throughout the local authority.

106. It is important that local Prevent leads have access to their senior local authority leadership to give advice and support.

Multi-agency partnerships

107. Local authorities are required to have multi-agency arrangements in place to effectively monitor and evaluate the impact of Prevent work and provide strategic governance.

108. Local authorities should make use of their local multi-agency group(s) to agree risk, co-ordinate Prevent activity, and offer support and advice. Links should be made to other statutory partnerships such as Safeguarding Partners Channel panels, Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASHs) and Youth Offending Teams.

109. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, local authorities must chair Channel panels and should seek co-operation as reasonably practicable from relevant specified authorities, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Details of what co-operation includes is outlined in the Channel duty guidance. Multi-agency involvement in Channel is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

Collaboration between areas

110. In two-tier areas in England, county and district councils should agree proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local Prevent partnership plans. It is expected that neighbouring areas should also agree

proportionate arrangements for sharing the assessment of risk and for agreeing local Prevent partnership plans as appropriate.

Community partnership

111. Prevent work conducted through local authorities will often directly involve and impact local communities. Effective dialogue and co-ordination with community-based organisations is essential for effective Prevent delivery. Engagement should also focus on raising awareness of the risks of radicalisation and providing credible challenge to the ideologies of extremist groups, including any disinformation about Prevent that they promote.

Other agencies and organisations supporting children

112. A range of private and voluntary agencies and organisations provide services or, in some cases, exercise functions in relation to children, including children's social care. The Prevent duty applies to those bodies, which include children's homes and independent fostering agencies and bodies exercising local authority functions, whether under voluntary delegation arrangements or via the use of statutory intervention powers. These bodies should ensure they are part of their local authorities' safeguarding arrangements and that staff are aware of the Prevent duty and know how to make a Prevent referral where appropriate.

Capabilities

113. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Capabilities](#).

Understanding risk

Training and induction

114. Local authorities are expected to ensure appropriate frontline staff, including those of its contractors, have a good understanding of Prevent, are trained to recognise where a person might be susceptible to becoming radicalised into terrorism, and are aware of available programmes to provide support. In local authorities, we anticipate that appropriate frontline staff should include child and adult social workers, family workers, early help workers, youth workers and support workers. This training should

be delivered at the earliest opportunity to ensure staff are adequately equipped for their role.

115. In addition to the recommended [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#), those with specific Prevent responsibilities are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any required ideology training^[footnote 27].

116. Local authority staff in frontline roles are also expected to receive training on how to make a Prevent referral within their local authority or to police if they think someone is at risk of being radicalised, and to understand the Channel process.

117. It is recommended that those with Prevent-specific responsibilities refresh their training at least every two years, enabling them to support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published [Prevent referral statistics](#), local referral trends and emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials^[footnote 28].

Out-of-school settings supporting children

118. Many children attend tuition, training, instruction or activities without their parents' or carers' supervision. Organisations or individuals that offer this provision to children (but which are not schools, colleges, alternative provision (AP) providers, 16 to 19 academies, or registered childcare providers) are known as 'out-of-school settings'. Typical examples of out-of-school settings include youth organisations, extracurricular clubs, private tuition and supplementary schools. These settings usually operate outside of schools, but some run part-time during the day to support children in home education. They operate in a wide range of venues, from community centres to places of worship and private homes.

119. These settings are not regulated under education and childcare law. This means there is no single responsible body with complete oversight of the quality and safety of provision in these settings. However, local authorities have a duty to safeguard children in their area, regardless of the education or childcare setting they attend. Local authorities should take steps to understand the range of activity and settings in their areas and should take appropriate and proportionate action to ensure that children attending such settings are properly safeguarded (which should include considering whether children attending such settings are at risk of being radicalised).

120. In assessing the risks associated with such settings, local authorities should consider whether the settings are implementing the recommended safeguarding

practices outlined in Department for Education's guidance on '[Keeping children safe in out-of-school settings](#)', and any other evidence about the extent to which they are taking steps to safeguard the children in their care.^[footnote 29] Where safeguarding concerns arise, local authorities should actively consider how to use the full range of powers available to them to reduce the risks to children, including those outlined in the guidance on [unregistered independent schools and out-of-school settings](#).^[footnote 30] There should also be clear systems in place for parents, safeguarding partners, providers and members of the public to report serious incidents – often through the Local Authority Designated Officer or children's social care, or through the police if a child is in immediate danger.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

121. To understand risk, local authorities are expected to produce a risk assessment which is specific to their circumstances. The assessment should consider the risks of radicalisation to people, as well as the risks from radicalising influences, in their area. To ensure that Prevent delivery and activity is guided by the threat, the Security Threat Check should be conducted. This should be informed by the counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs), produced for every region by the police. CTLPs enable local authorities to effectively target activity to prevent terrorism and build resilience. [Guidance on counter-terrorism local profiles is available on GOV.UK](#).^[footnote 31] Additionally, local authorities should include Prevent within their corporate risk register.

122. The development of local situational risk assessments is typically overseen by the designated Prevent lead. However, it should also be informed by engagement with other local authority staff, schools, social workers, registered childcare providers, universities, colleges, local prisons, probation services, health, immigration enforcement, Youth Offending Teams and others, as well as by a local authority's own knowledge of its area.

123. Local authorities should ensure the Prevent duty is part of policies and procedures that deal with identifying and supporting people at risk of radicalisation, such as adult and children's social care. The Prevent duty is relevant to local authorities' functions in relation to public protection, crime and disorder, and safeguarding. Local authorities and safeguarding boards should ensure that there are clear and robust policies and processes to identify children and adults at risk. This guidance should be read alongside safeguarding guidance.

124. Local authority staff who participate in a Channel panel may be required to provide support to people who are on the Channel programme. [Guidance on Channel](#) is

available for England and Wales [\[footnote 32\]](#).

Prevent partnership plan

125. With the support of Prevent leads and others through the multi-agency group, all local authorities should lead in developing – alongside multi-agency partners – a Prevent partnership plan specific to the local authority to manage the risk of people becoming radicalised into terrorism in that area. This will help the local authority to comply with the Prevent duty, alongside partners, and address the risks identified within the local risk assessment and CTLPs.

126. Prevent partnership plans should be tailored to the local circumstances and developed using local risk assessments and the counter-terrorism local profiles. The Security Threat Check should be undertaken to ensure that activity aligns with the threat. Partnership plans can be devised by an individual local authority and its partners, across a number of local authorities. In a two-tier area, they can be developed by a lead authority inclusive of the needs of all authorities in the area.

127. Prevent partnership plans should comprehensively identify, prioritise and facilitate activities to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism specific to the region. Existing service delivery should be used and incorporate Prevent activities wherever possible and appropriate. The Prevent partnership plan should be referenced in relevant corporate and service strategies, plans and policies, and ensure the progress of the Prevent duty benchmarks outlined in the [Prevent duty toolkit](#). [\[footnote 33\]](#) Local authorities receiving Prevent project funding should use this funding to deliver Prevent-specific projects. Projects should have clear objectives to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology, and activity should be directed by the Prevent partnership plan. All projects should have appropriate oversight and a clear evaluation strategy. Many of these projects and activities should be community-based.

128. Where appropriate, when new contracts for delivery of any services are being made, we also expect local authorities to ensure that the principles of the Prevent duty are written into those contracts in a suitable form.

Sharing information

129. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Sharing information](#).

130. Local authorities should ensure they comply with data protection legislation. For some information sharing, it may be good practice to have information sharing agreements in place.

Reducing permissive environments

131. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Reducing permissive environments](#).

132. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content used by such radicalisers, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives. ^{[[footnote 34](#)]}

133. Local authority settings should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes ensuring that any event spaces, publicly-owned venues and resources or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others.

134. Local authorities should have a policy, based on local risk assessments, that clearly articulates the activities and behaviours of a group or person which may make them subject to restrictions on access to publicly-owned venues and resources. The policy should articulate relevant considerations for awarding contracts for the delivery of local authority services. It is important that the policy is embedded throughout the local authority.

135. It is also important that Prevent funding does not go to organisations or people whose views are used to legitimise, encourage or support terrorism-related activity. Counter-radicalisation work cannot be entrusted to those who are sympathetic to terrorists and their ideas. We expect local authorities to conduct their own due diligence checks to ensure that organisations who they work with on Prevent do not espouse or endorse extremist views linked to terrorism.

136. Local authorities must comply with the Prevent duty and should bear in mind that aligning with, or seeking advice from, people or organisations who encourage non-compliance could undermine public confidence in their compliance.

137. Local authorities should also consider whether IT equipment that they make available to the public should use filtering solutions that stop access to material which supports terrorism or extremist ideas linked to terrorism. The [Prevent duty toolkit for local authorities](#) gives further guidance on how local authorities should deliver Prevent.

[\[footnote 35\]](#) It also sets out the benchmarks for reducing the permissive environment. These include having comprehensive plans and policies in place to limit radicalising influences where appropriate, and having an awareness of what these are in the local area.

Monitoring and assurance

138. This section should be read alongside Section 4: [Monitoring and assurance](#). Monitoring and Assurance The Home Office will continue to have oversight of all Prevent leads within local authorities, as well as evaluation and monitoring of any Prevent-funded projects. In fulfilling its central monitoring role, the Home Office will scrutinise local Prevent Partnership Plans, project impact and overall performance. Further details on the benchmarking used for Prevent partnership plans is found in the [Prevent duty toolkit](#). [\[footnote 36\]](#)

139. If there are concerns about compliance, the Home Office may consider the appropriateness of using existing mechanisms such as appointing an inspector, requiring the local authority to undertake specific actions, requesting an inquiry, or issuing a direction. Powers under the Local Government Act 1999 or the Local Government and Elections (Wales) Act 2021 may be used.

140. If the Secretary of State is satisfied that a local authority is failing to perform any function relating to education, childcare or children's social care to an adequate standard, they may use their powers under the Education Act 1996, the Children's Act, and children's social care under Section 50(1) of the Children Act 2004 to take whatever action is deemed appropriate to achieve necessary improvement. In Wales, Welsh ministers have the power to intervene under the School Standards and Organisation (Wales) Act 2013. These intervention measures are considered in cases where Ofsted inspections (or Estyn in Wales) identify inadequate practice and serious concerns about practice in relation to safeguarding, adoption and looked-after children. The Care Inspectorate Wales has a role in terms of care settings and standards.

Education

141. Children and young people continue to make up a significant proportion of Channel cases, and in recent years there have been concerns regarding increased numbers of learners being arrested for terrorism-related offences. Educators are often in a unique position, through interacting with learners on a regular basis, to be able to identify concerning behaviour changes that may indicate they are susceptible to radicalisation. Settings should not only be alert to violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, including certain divisive or intolerant narratives which can reasonably be linked to terrorism. [Educate Against Hate](#) and [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provide further information on extremist narratives. [\[footnote 37\]](#) [\[footnote 38\]](#)

142. Education settings that are subject to the Prevent duty (as outlined in the specified authorities section) should understand these requirements as part of their wider safeguarding and welfare responsibilities. For schools and colleges, this guidance should be read alongside relevant safeguarding guidance. In England, this includes [‘Working together to safeguard children’](#) [\[footnote 39\]](#) [\[footnote 40\]](#) and [‘Keeping children safe in education’](#) [\[footnote 41\]](#). In Wales, it should be read alongside [‘Keeping learners safe’](#). [\[footnote 41\]](#)

143. The Department for Education has also published supporting advice for schools and further education settings on [managing the risk of radicalisation](#) in their education setting. [\[footnote 42\]](#)

144. Compliance with the Prevent duty will reflect existing good practice on safeguarding. For example, it will ensure susceptibility to radicalisation is incorporated into safeguarding training, policies and risk assessments. It is not anticipated that compliance will result in additional burdens on settings.

145. This guidance uses the term ‘setting’ to refer to all education providers who are specified authorities subject to the Prevent duty, and the term ‘learner’ to refer to pupils and students across all phases of education provision.

Specified authorities

146. The schools and registered childcare settings specified in [Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(CTSA 2015\)](#) are as follows [\[footnote 43\]](#):

- the proprietors of maintained schools, non-maintained special schools, maintained nursery schools, independent schools (including academies and free schools) and alternative provision academies

- 16 to 19 academies
- the management committees of Pupil Referral Units
- registered early years childcare settings
- registered later years childcare settings
- providers of holiday schemes for disabled children
- persons exercising local authority functions under a direction of the Secretary of State when the local authority is performing inadequately
- persons authorised by virtue of an order made under Section 70 of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 to exercise a function specified in Schedule 36A to the Education Act 1996

147. The further education institutions specified in Schedule 6 to the CTSA 2015 fall into the following categories:

- further education providers which are subject to the Ofsted inspection regime in Chapter 3 of Part 8 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006, and which receive funding from the Secretary of State or a combined authority established under [Section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009](#) – further education institutions in Wales are funded by the Welsh Government^[footnote 44]
- commissioned contract holders funded by the Welsh Government to deliver apprenticeships and employability programmes
- the governing body or proprietor of a further education provider at which more than 250 students, excluding students undertaking distance learning courses, are undertaking courses in preparation for examinations related to qualifications regulated by the Office of Qualifications and Examinations (Ofqual) or are regulated by Qualifications Wales or the Welsh Government

148. The higher education institutions specified in Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015 are as follows:

- the governing body of qualifying institutions within the meaning given by Section 11 of the Higher Education Act 2004 ('Relevant Higher Education Bodies', or 'RHEBs'), and the Higher Education Act 2015 (Wales)
- the governing body or proprietor of institutions (not otherwise listed) at which more than 250 students, excluding students undertaking distance learning courses, are

undertaking higher education courses mentioned in Schedule 6 to the Education Reform Act 1988

149. These include in particular:

- providers that are registered with the Office for Students (OfS) in England or regulated by Higher Education Funding Council Wales (HEFCW) in Wales
- providers that are not registered with the OfS in England or regulated by HEFCW in Wales but have more than 250 higher education students (excluding students on distance learning courses)
- institutions delivering courses that are designated for student support by the Secretary of State or by Welsh ministers
- the autonomous constituent colleges, schools and halls of the Universities of Cambridge, Durham and Oxford

Leadership and partnership

150. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Leadership and partnership](#).

151. All education providers should have a designated lead in a senior management role who is responsible for the delivery of Prevent. They should ensure that there are appropriate capabilities (to understand and manage risk) and that the role and importance of Prevent is made clear to relevant staff.

152. Particularly for large and multi-site organisations and institutions, management and co-ordination should consider the size and organisational arrangements, so information is shared appropriately, with a clear point of contact for operational delivery of Prevent activity.

153. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, education providers must co-operate as reasonably practicable with local authority-led Channel panels, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015, with details of what co-operation includes outlined in the Channel duty guidance. Multi-agency involvement in Channel is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

154. Effective partnership can also be demonstrated by engaging appropriately where required with other partners, such as the police and Prevent leads in local authorities. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in best practice.

More information on the role of Channel panels and the requirements of panel members can be found by consulting the [Channel duty guidance](#).^[footnote 45]

Training is also available for those who may be asked to contribute to, or sit on, a Channel panel.

Capabilities

155. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Capabilities](#).

Understanding risk

Training and induction

156. Education settings should make sure that relevant staff have training that could help them prevent learners from being radicalised into terrorism. This training should be delivered at the earliest opportunity to ensure staff are adequately equipped for their role.

157. We would expect appropriate members of staff to understand the factors that lead people to support terrorist ideologies or engage in terrorist-related activity. Such staff should have sufficient training to be able to recognise susceptibility to terrorism and be aware of what action to take in response, including the setting's internal Prevent referral arrangements.

158. It is for each setting to determine who the appropriate members of staff are and how frequently training should occur, being proportionate to the risk of terrorism and extremism in their local area and their phase of education or type of setting. Planning for staff training should include considering what level of knowledge is proportionate for different roles. This will include staff who interact most frequently with learners, but also those who are responsible for overseeing adherence with the Prevent duty or those with specific functions to undertake, such as those who manage external speakers and events, and external agencies and partners with relevant responsibilities.

159. The Designated Safeguarding Leads (DSL) or Prevent lead in the setting should receive more in-depth training, including on extremist and terrorist ideologies, how to make referrals and how to work with Channel panels. It is recommended that this training is updated at least every two years, enabling the lead to support other staff on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published [Prevent referral statistics](#), relevant local or regional incidents, or new resources and training materials.^[footnote 46] For the settings where it applies, these requirements are consistent with those set out in ‘[Keeping children safe in education](#)’.^[footnote 47]

160. Consideration should be given to the appropriateness and reliability of training resources. Settings should consider carefully whether the material they use is suitable for their context and from an authoritative source and not – for example, material that includes advice which undermines or frustrates the purposes of Prevent, such as promoting non-compliance. It is recommended that providers undertake their own due diligence before taking advice or using training resources from external organisations. Further advice on training may be provided by your local authority safeguarding team and government quality assured resources are available on [Educate Against Hate](#). [Guidance on using appropriate external agencies for schools in England](#), particularly with regard to political impartiality requirements, is available on GOV.UK.^[footnote 48]

Government training sources

The [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) service is free to access and provides courses covering Prevent awareness, the referral process, Channel and a refresher awareness course.^[footnote 49]

Schools and further education providers can get additional training materials, resources and practical guidance covering extremism and radicalisation from the Department for Education’s [Educate Against Hate](#) website.^[footnote 50]

Higher education providers can access additional [training materials on GOV.UK](#)^[footnote 51]

Managing risk

Risk assessment

161. Education settings should have robust safeguarding policies in place to ensure that those at risk of radicalisation are identified and appropriate support is provided. Settings should consider the process for how learners or staff raise concerns regarding

radicalisation internally and the approach for submitting a Prevent referral, including use of the Prevent [national referral form](#).^[footnote 52] These policies and procedures will help an institution satisfy itself and government that it is able to identify and support people.

162. Policies should be proportionate and based on an understanding, shared with partners, of the threat and risk in the local area, the phase of education, and the size and type of setting. Each setting should perform a risk assessment which assesses how their learners or staff may be at risk of being radicalised into terrorism, including online. Where specific risks are identified, settings should develop an action plan to set out the steps they will take to mitigate the risk. This guidance does not prescribe what appropriate decisions would be as this will be up to settings to determine, having considered all the factors.

163. This does not mean that settings are required to have a separate policy on the Prevent duty. The Prevent duty should be seen as part of the setting's wider safeguarding approach, and therefore these considerations should be incorporated into existing policies and risk assessments, where appropriate to do so. As part of this, settings should include the process for how learners or staff should raise concerns regarding radicalisation internally, and how these are then assessed.

164. When devising policies and conducting risk assessments, settings should consider other relevant responsibilities and requirements. This includes the Equality Act 2010 and the requirements of data protection legislation. In schools, settings should also consider political impartiality requirements, and further education and higher education settings should be especially mindful of duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom (including under Section 31 of the CTSA 2015). Where a setting has sub-contracted the delivery of courses to other settings, we expect procedures to be in place to ensure that the sub-contractor is aware of the Prevent duty.

There are non-statutory self-assessment tools available to assist [schools](#) and [further education providers](#) in understanding how well embedded their existing policies and practices are.^[footnote 53] ^[footnote 54] Advice on [understanding and identifying radicalisation risk in your education setting](#) is also available.^[footnote 55]

For schools and further education providers, additional [non-statutory advice on managing the risk of radicalisation](#), including considerations regarding making a Prevent referral, is available on GOV.UK.^[footnote 56] They should consider this

alongside wider relevant safeguarding guidance, including ‘[Keeping children safe in education](#)’.^[footnote 57]

For higher education, there are [training materials on risk assessments and action plans](#) available on GOV.UK.^[footnote 58] The Office for Students has also published a webinar for higher education settings on [conducting risk assessments](#).^[footnote 59]

165. Where relevant, settings should consider other additional guidance, including:

- Chapter 1 of ‘[Working together to safeguard children](#)’, which includes a myth-busting guide to information sharing^[footnote 60]
- ‘[Keeping children safe in education](#)’.^[footnote 61]
- ‘[Information sharing: advice for practitioners providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers](#)’.^[footnote 62]
- ‘[Keeping learners safe](#)’ (Wales)^[footnote 63]

Student unions and societies

166. Where relevant, policies should set out what is expected from students’ unions and student societies in relation to Prevent. We would expect settings to engage and consult students on their plans for implementing the duty and for students’ unions and student societies to work closely with their setting and co-operate with their policies.

167. Student unions which are charitable bodies and registered with the Charity Commission are subject to charity laws and regulations, including those that relate to preventing terrorism. Charitable bodies should make clear in their policies how they will protect people from harm. They should follow the guidance in ‘[Protecting charities from abuse for extremist purposes](#)’.^[footnote 64] This advises that trustees should actively manage the risk of speakers or literature breaking the law, for example by:

- encouraging or glorifying terrorism
- inciting hatred on the grounds of race, religion or sexual orientation
- inciting criminal acts or public order offences

168. Higher and further education providers should also consider whether student union staff and elected officers would benefit from online Prevent awareness training, including the Home Office e-learning offer, or other relevant training provided by the Charity Commission, regional Prevent co-ordinators or others.

Sharing information

169. As part of their existing approach to safeguarding, settings should already have robust procedures for sharing information, both internally and externally. Information sharing is vital in promoting the welfare of learners and staff. Failure to share relevant information can affect the safety, welfare and educational outcomes of learners. As part of this, the setting should have a clear policy on their approach for submitting a Prevent referral, including use of the Prevent [national referral form](#).^[footnote 65]

170. When seeking to share personal data regarding people susceptible to radicalisation, practitioners should consider whether it is appropriate to rely on the person's consent and must comply with the requirements of data protection legislation. Where it is not possible to rely on consent, it is still possible to share information if there is a [lawful basis](#) for doing so.

171. In schools and colleges, it is important to refer to requirements set out in '[Keeping children safe in education](#)' in England, or '[Keeping learners safe](#)' in Wales.^[footnote 66]
^[footnote 67] This includes ensuring that when a child leaves a school or college, relevant information about engagement with Channel and the outcome of this should be securely transferred within the appropriate child protection file. This enables the new setting to have support in place in advance of a child joining.

172. Settings can find information on their obligations and how to comply at the [Information Commissioner's Office](#).^[footnote 68]

Reducing permissive environments

173. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Reducing permissive environments](#).

174. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, can help reduce the risk of people from becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives.
^[footnote 69]

175. Settings should have measures in place to prevent their facilities being exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others.

176. This does not mean that the Prevent duty should limit discussion of these issues. Instead, education settings should be spaces in which people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including, where appropriate, terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology, and learn how to challenge these ideas.

177. When doing so, settings should encourage learners to respect other people, with particular regard to the protected characteristics set out in the Equality Act 2010.

178. Further and higher education institutions must have particular regard to a need or relevant duty to ensure freedom of speech, and to the importance of academic freedom.

179. Specified authorities should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken. Additionally, when seeking advice on the Prevent duty, specified authorities should be aware that some people, groups or organisations purporting to give such advice might encourage them not to comply with the Prevent duty.

Building resilience through the curriculum (schools and further education)

180. Schools and further education settings support learners to have the knowledge, skills and values that will prepare them to be citizens in modern Britain. As part of this, in England, they are required to actively promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.

181. In addition to preparing learners for life in modern Britain, by promoting these shared values, settings can help build resilience to radicalisation and extremism. For example, they can provide a safe environment for debating controversial issues and helping learners to understand how they can influence and participate in decision making.

182. For schools, there are opportunities in the curriculum to explore relevant topics, such as in Citizenship and Relationships, Sex and Health Education (RSHE). This includes learning around building positive relationships and the importance of respecting difference, and, for example, taking part in the United Nations Rights Respecting Schools Programme. Schools can also build resilience through their ethos

and the ways in which they organise themselves, including by promoting democracy through school elections.

183. When considering how to build learners resilience to radicalisation, schools and further education settings should take a proportionate approach, accounting for the age of the learners and type of education being offered.

184. In doing so, schools in England must also be mindful of their existing duties on political impartiality and to ensure the balanced presentation of political issues.

[Guidance on political impartiality is available on GOV.UK](#)^[footnote 70]

185. In Wales, independent schools set their own curriculum, but must comply with Independent Schools Standards made by the Welsh ministers. These standards also include a requirement to promote the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of learners.

The Department for Education publishes learning materials and resources for schools and further education providers on how to challenge radical views on [Educate Against Hate](#).^[footnote 71]

This includes specific resources on how to have conversations related to different forms of extremism, including [Islamist extremism](#) and [Extreme Right-Wing ideology](#). [There is also a specific resource on online extremism](#).^[footnote 72]

[Guidance on promoting fundamental British values is also available on GOV.UK](#)^[footnote 73]

For early years, the [foundation stage statutory framework](#) supports providers to do this in an age-appropriate way, through ensuring children learn right from wrong, mix and share with other children, and value other views.^[footnote 74]

IT policies

186. Settings will likely already have policies relating to the appropriate use of their IT equipment and networks, which should contain specific reference to the Prevent duty. Many settings already use filtering as a means of restricting access to harmful content and should consider the use of filters as part of their overall strategy to prevent people from becoming involved in, or supporting, terrorism.

187. The content and proportionality of these policies are a matter for providers and will be informed, in part, by the Prevent risk assessment.

188. For further and higher education providers, there should be clear policies in place for students and staff using IT equipment and networks to research terrorism and counter-terrorism in the course of their learning. [Universities UK has published advice](#) on this. [\[footnote 75\]](#)

For schools and colleges in England, [‘Keeping children safe in education’](#) and [‘Meeting digital and technology standards’](#) provides advice on appropriate filtering and monitoring systems. [\[footnote 76\]](#) [\[footnote 77\]](#) In Wales [‘Keeping learners safe’](#) should be followed. [\[footnote 78\]](#)

The [UK Safer Internet Centre has published guidance](#) on what appropriate filtering and monitoring might look like. [\[footnote 79\]](#)

For higher education settings, the [Office for Students has published guidance on web filtering and monitoring](#), including effective practice. [\[footnote 80\]](#)

[Jisc](#), an education charity focused on technology, can provide specialist advice and support to the further and higher education sectors to help providers ensure students are safe online and appropriate safeguards are in place.

External speakers and events

189. Settings should consider the extent to which any external speakers and events held on their premises pose a risk of radicalising learners into terrorism.

190. Encouragement of terrorism, including glorifying the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism, fundraising for the purposes of terrorism, and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, are all criminal offences. Settings should not provide a platform for these offences to be committed.

191. When deciding whether to host a particular speaker, settings should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute views that are used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism, or are shared by terrorist groups. It is recommended for settings to undertake their own due diligence to understand any risks around a particular speaker.

Schools

192. As part of managing the risk of radicalisation, schools’ safeguarding policies should set out clear protocols for ensuring that any visiting speakers, whether invited by staff or by children themselves, are suitable and appropriately supervised. In

England, the Prevent duty complements schools' other responsibilities for ensuring that speakers do not undermine the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.

193. When using external agencies, schools in England must be mindful of their existing duties regarding political impartiality and ensure the balanced presentation of political issues. [Guidance on political impartiality is available on GOV.UK](#)^[footnote 81]

Further and higher education settings

194. In carrying out the Prevent duty, further and higher education settings must have particular regard to their duties relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom.

195. Freedom of speech is not an absolute right, and it does not include the right for individuals to harass others or incite them to violence or terrorism.

196. All settings should have policies and procedures in place for the risk assessment and management of funded, affiliated or branded events, whether they are held on or off premises, or hosted online. The policies should clearly set out what is required for any event to proceed.

197. Every setting needs to balance its legal duties in terms of both securing freedom of speech and protecting learner and staff welfare. There is no prescription from government (or the OfS) regarding what actions any setting should take once they have had due regard under the Prevent duty. In most cases, we expect that these risks can be mitigated without shutting down speech.

Freedom of speech duties under the Education (No. 2) Act 1986

Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 applies to registered higher education providers and further education institutions in England.

This places a duty on providers to “take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers”.

The duty includes ensuring, so far as reasonably practicable, that no person or group is denied use of any premises for reasons related to their beliefs or views, or those of any member of the group, or related to the group's policy or objectives.

Freedom of speech duties under the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023

The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 applies to England only and is anticipated to come into force in the 2024/25 academic year. It amends the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 to impose new, strengthened duties on registered higher education providers, their constituent colleges and students' unions at approved (fee cap) providers.

In addition, it strengthens the duty previously imposed by Section 43 on the governing body of a registered higher education provider “to take the steps that, having particular regard to the importance of freedom of speech, are reasonably practicable for it to take in order to achieve the objective” of securing freedom of speech within the law for staff, members, students and visiting speakers.

Once in force, Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 will no longer apply to registered higher education providers.

198. As part of the response to the Independent Review of Prevent, the Department for Education has committed to ensuring effective support is in place for those assessing the risk from external speakers in higher education, including on conducting effective due diligence. This will be made available on GOV.UK.

Monitoring and assurance

199. This section should be read alongside Section 4: [Monitoring and assurance](#).

Schools and registered childcare settings

200. Ofsted inspects the relevant specified authorities (as listed at the beginning of this section) in England. This includes ensuring that those with governance or oversight responsibilities for settings are fulfilling their statutory duties under the Prevent duty.

201. Privately funded independent schools in England are inspected either by Ofsted or the Independent Schools Inspectorate (ISI). Ofsted and ISI inspect against the Independent Schools Standards, which include that arrangements have been made to safeguard and promote the welfare of pupils and that the setting has had regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.

202. In Wales, all publicly-funded and independent schools are inspected by Estyn.

203. The Education Inspection Framework sets out how Ofsted inspects maintained schools, academies, non-association independent schools, further education and skills provision, and registered early years settings in England. Ofsted's current inspection framework for early years provision reflects the requirements in the early years foundation stage statutory framework. ISI's inspection framework sets out how it inspects independent schools in England, including residential (boarding) schools and registered early years settings.

204. Inspectors will evaluate the extent to which the setting has a culture of safeguarding that supports effective arrangements to identify learners who may need early help or who are at risk of harm or exploitation, including radicalisation. For Ofsted and ISI, this forms part of the leadership and management judgement. Governors in particular, must ensure that the school's arrangements for safeguarding meet statutory requirements.

Further education

205. Ofsted inspects publicly funded further education and skills providers and provision in England under the education inspection framework. This includes further education colleges, sixth form colleges and 16 to 19 academies, and providers of apprenticeships and other skills training. The inspection process and evaluation criteria are set out in the further education and skills inspection handbook. This inspection is risk-based and the frequency of inspections depends partly on this risk. Safeguarding is inspected as part of the leadership and management judgement.

206. In Wales, inspection is carried out by Estyn. This includes evaluating the extent to which the setting has a culture of safeguarding, including protecting learners from radicalisation and extremism.

207. It is a condition of funding from the Department for Education and the Welsh Government that all further education and independent training settings must actively promote British values and comply with the Prevent duty. Separate legislation, and funding conditions, require settings to comply with safeguarding duties and guidance.

Higher education

208. The Secretary of State appointed the OfS to monitor compliance with the Prevent duty in England. [The OfS has published a separate monitoring framework](#) which sets out the details of how monitoring of the duty is undertaken.^{[[footnote 82](#)]}

209. The Secretary of State has delegated to Higher Education Funding Council Wales (HEFCW) responsibility for monitoring compliance of the Prevent duty for Relevant

Higher Education Bodies (RHEBs) in Wales.

210. RHEBs in Wales need to follow the [HEFCW monitoring framework](#) to demonstrate compliance with the duty. [\[footnote 83\]](#)

Healthcare

211. Healthcare professionals have a key role in Prevent because they will meet and treat people who may be susceptible to radicalisation. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism.

212. Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause. A person's susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to them having underlying vulnerabilities. A significant proportion of work under the Prevent duty in healthcare relates to safeguarding vulnerable people at risk of exploitation or abuse. Vulnerability is defined in different ways by different organisations and services. This may impose safeguarding duties, for example, relating to age or certain mental or physical health conditions. It can also include wider vulnerabilities related to personal, family or social circumstances.

213. Healthcare professionals should consider both the person's best interests and the public interest. For example, if they were concerned that a patient was being radicalised, a Prevent referral could allow the patient to get the help and support needed to prevent them being radicalised into terrorism.

Health specified authorities

214. The health specified authorities in [Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(CTSA 2015\)](#) are as follows [\[footnote 84\]](#):

- an NHS Trust in England and Wales
- an NHS foundation trust
- a Local Health Board in Wales

- the Board of Community Health Councils in Wales

Leadership and partnership

215. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Leadership and partnership](#).

216. In complying with the Prevent duty, those in senior management positions should actively engage with other partners including police and other local or regional Prevent leads. They should ensure that there are appropriate capabilities (to understand and manage risk) and that the role and importance of Prevent are made clear to relevant staff. There are also a range of other local Prevent partners who can offer advice and support. This provision varies depending on geographic location, but will usually be local structures such as Prevent steering groups or Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs.

217. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, healthcare providers must co-operate with local authority-led Channel panels so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Multi-agency involvement in Channel is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

218. Effective partnership can also be demonstrated by engaging appropriately where required with other partners, such as the police and Prevent leads in local authorities. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in operational delivery and best practice.

219. The Chief Nursing Officer in NHS England has executive lead and accountability to ensure the effective discharge of NHS England statutory safeguarding responsibilities, including Prevent. Further information on safeguarding responsibilities and structures can be found in NHS England's [safeguarding accountability and assurance framework](#).
[\[footnote 85\]](#)

220. All sub-regions in England within the NHS should, under the framework, have in place local safeguarding forums, including local commissioners and providers of NHS services. These forums have oversight of compliance with the Prevent duty and ensure effective delivery. Within each area, the Regional Safeguarding Leads (RSLs) are responsible for promoting Prevent to providers and commissioners of NHS services, supporting organisations with their Prevent policies, procedures and compliance, and delivering training.

221. The Prevent Partnership Group, led by the Department of Health and Social Care, is a forum to bring topical policy and operational issues to the group for discussion and consideration. It provides insight into the work of other government departments and Prevent partner organisations. It is attended by working level leads from government departments, RSLs and representatives from NHS arm's length bodies.

222. In Wales, NHS Trusts and Health Boards have counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) Prevent leads and are part of multi-agency structures where these are in place. This guidance should be read in conjunction with '[Building partnerships, staying safe](#)' issued by the Department of Health and Social Care, which provides advice to healthcare organisations on their role in preventing people being radicalised into terrorism as part of their safeguarding responsibilities.^{[[footnote 86](#)]} The heads of safeguarding provide organisational leadership on Prevent and attend Prevent delivery groups, Channel and CONTEST meetings as health representatives.

Capabilities

223. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty [Capabilities](#).

Understanding risk

Training and induction

224. A key expectation for the healthcare sector is to ensure that healthcare professionals are trained to recognise where a person might be susceptible to becoming radicalised into terrorism, know how to refer someone into Prevent, and are aware of available programmes to provide support. To do this, there should be:

- a programme to deliver Prevent training, in line with guidance from the Home Office and Health Education England
- processes in place to ensure that, as well as using the intercollegiate guidance, staff receive Prevent awareness training appropriate to their role as set out in the [Prevent training and competencies framework](#)^{[[footnote 87](#)]}
- risk assessment which helps to inform decisions on the appropriate training requirements, as well as the broader management of risk both to and from people who may be susceptible to radicalisation into terrorism

225. Preventing someone from being radicalised into terrorism should be managed in the same way as other safeguarding responsibilities within healthcare – for example,

child abuse or domestic violence.

226. Prevent is a key strand of NHS England's safeguarding arrangements, meaning that Prevent awareness and other relevant training is delivered to all professionals who provide services to NHS patients. These arrangements are effective and should continue.

227. The intercollegiate guidance documents, '[Safeguarding children and young people: roles and competencies for healthcare staff](#)', and '[Adult safeguarding: roles and competencies for health care staff](#)' include Prevent information and identify competencies for all healthcare professionals against six levels.^[footnote 88] ^[footnote 89] Prevent training is mandatory for all NHS trusts and foundation trusts. Training is also mandatory for NHS provider organisations, NHS commissioners and organisations providing services on behalf of the NHS, to meet contractual obligations in relation to safeguarding training, as set out in the [NHS Standard Contract](#)^[footnote 90]. All relevant healthcare professionals should receive annual updates and three-yearly refresher training.

228. The training provides all relevant healthcare professionals with the skills to recognise susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism and what action to take in response. This includes local processes and policies that will enable them to make referrals to Prevent and how to receive additional advice and support. The [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) is available to all healthcare professionals.^[footnote 91] In addition, the Royal College of GPs (RCGP) and the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCPsych) have their own specific training for healthcare professionals within their respective sectors. Health Education England also have a suite of Prevent training products that are specific to the NHS in terms of content and case studies.

229. In addition to the recommended [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#), healthcare professionals with Prevent responsibilities are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any required ideology training.^[footnote 92]

230. It is recommended that those with Prevent-specific responsibilities refresh their training at least every two years, enabling them to support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published [Prevent referral statistics](#), local referral trends and emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials.^[footnote 93]

Managing risk

Risk assessment

231. As the Prevent duty has been in place since 2015, we expect there to already be established arrangements in place. Each organisation should understand where and how the people they serve may be at risk of being radicalised into terrorism, tailored to their local circumstances. Prevent risk assessments should be reviewed and where appropriate, refreshed annually. It may often be appropriate to incorporate these risk assessments into broader safeguarding risk assessments.

232. In fulfilling the Prevent duty, health organisations should demonstrate effective action in the following areas:

- supporting and participating with the Channel process where necessary
- policies that include the principles of the Prevent NHS guidance and toolkit, which are set out in [‘Building partnerships, staying safe: guidance for healthcare organisations’](#) ^[footnote 94]
- procedures to comply with the NHS Prevent training and competencies framework

233. We expect the safeguarding lead to have networks in place for their own advice and support to make referrals into Prevent. The Prevent [national referral form](#) should be used for referrals into Prevent. ^[footnote 95]

234. The [NHS Standard Contract](#) is used for all commissioned services excluding primary care, including private and voluntary organisations. The safeguarding section of the contract requires providers to include Prevent in their delivery of safeguarding services, policies and training. ^[footnote 96]

Sharing information

235. Healthcare establishments should ensure they comply with the requirements of data protection legislation, and it is important that healthcare professionals understand how to balance patient confidentiality with the Prevent duty.

236. When making a referral, healthcare professionals should be aware of any information sharing agreements in place with other sectors. They should also understand how to get advice and support on confidentiality issues when responding to potential evidence that someone is being radicalised into terrorism or supporting terrorism, either during informal contact or consultation and treatment.

237. NHS [information sharing guidance](#) has been developed to help healthcare staff that are involved in information sharing and information governance for the purposes of safeguarding people from radicalisation under the Prevent programme. ^[footnote 97] The aim of this document is to support health practitioners to be confident in their actions

and to understand how they can share information appropriately, proportionately and lawfully.

Reducing permissive environments

238. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Reducing permissive environments](#).

239. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content used by such radicalisers, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Specified authorities should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives. [\[footnote 98\]](#)

240. Health providers should consider whether IT equipment available to the public should use filtering solutions that stop access to material which supports terrorism or extremist ideas linked to terrorism.

241. Specified authorities should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken. Additionally, when seeking advice on the Prevent duty, specified authorities should be aware that some people, groups or organisations claiming to give such advice might encourage them not to comply with the Prevent duty.

Monitoring and assurance

242. This section should be read alongside Section 4: [Monitoring and assurance](#).

243. Within the NHS, local safeguarding forums including local commissioners and providers of NHS services have oversight of fulfilling the Prevent duty and ensuring effective delivery. NHS England holds the role of assurance through the [NHS Standard Contract](#). [\[footnote 99\]](#)

244. Externally, the Care Quality Commission has regulatory oversight of independent and NHS-controlled providers, ensuring that they provide quality patient care on a sustainable basis.

245. In Wales, the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales and the Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales provide monitoring arrangements.

Police

246. The police are uniquely placed to tackle terrorism and therefore play an essential role in most aspects of Prevent work. They hold information which can help assess the risk of radicalisation and disrupt people engaged in radicalising others. The police also work alongside community organisations, as well as other specified authorities.

247. Recognising the parallels between radicalisation and other forms of harm, Prevent should be embedded into all aspects of policing including patrol, neighbourhood and safeguarding functions. In fulfilment of the Prevent duty, consideration should be given to the use of all suitable police resources, not just those specifically designed as Prevent.

Police specified authorities

248. The police specified authorities listed in [Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(CTSA 2015\)](#) are as follows^{[\[footnote 100\]](#)}:

- police forces in England and Wales (through their Chief Officers of Police)
- Police and Crime Commissioners
- the British Transport Police
- port police forces
- the Civil Nuclear Police Authority

Leadership and partnership

249. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Leadership and partnership](#).

250. Much of the police contribution to counter terrorism takes place through the Counter Terrorism Policing network. Chief Constables should be assured that their force is working effectively with the Counter Terrorism Policing network and Counter Terrorism Units. They should maintain Prevent capabilities, including the ability to identify people who are susceptible to radicalisation and they should gather information accordingly.

251. In complying with the Prevent duty, those in leadership positions should actively engage with other internal and external partners, such as local authority strategic Prevent leads, Regional Prevent Co-ordinators and other local or regional Prevent leads. This provision varies depending on geographic location but will usually include local authority Prevent contacts and local structures such as Prevent steering groups or Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs.

252. Effective partnership working should be demonstrated by engaging with other partners such as the local authority and the Home Office. This allows for a shared understanding of risk and threat posed and the latest developments in operational delivery and best practice. It also means engaging with the local multi-agency groups that will assess the risk of people being susceptible to radicalisation and sharing the counter-terrorism local profile (CTLP) with appropriate partners.

253. Prevent requires a multi-agency approach to support people susceptible to becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. As key partners on local authority chaired Channel panels, police should work closely with Channel partners to help progress Channel actions.

254. Police should also:

- work with multi-agency partners to develop a Prevent action plan to address local risk
- support local authority Prevent leads in developing Prevent-related projects to help build community resilience
- ensure Prevent considerations are fully embedded into counter-terrorism investigations
- provide support to Prevent Case Management

Capabilities

255. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Capabilities](#).

Understanding risk

Training and induction

256. As with all specified authorities, it is important that appropriate officers and staff know why radicalisation to terrorism is relevant to their setting and how it may present. Officers and staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be susceptible to extremist ideologies and being radicalised into terrorism. They need to be aware of what the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ mean, and of how to escalate any concerns within their force.

257. In addition to the recommended [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#), frontline staff and others with Prevent responsibilities are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any required ideology training. [\[footnote 101\]](#)

258. We expect training to be provided appropriate to roles, and those with Prevent responsibilities to have appropriate training at the earliest opportunity. Training should also be regularly reviewed and refreshed. Training records should be in place. It is important that police forces consider the risk in their force area and use that to inform training programmes. It is recommended that those with Prevent-specific responsibilities refresh their training at least every two years, enabling them to support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published [Prevent referral statistics](#), local referral trends and emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials. [\[footnote 102\]](#)

Managing risk

Risk assessment

259. Police have a key role in managing risk of radicalisation to terrorism. This includes risks both to and from people.

260. Police forces should have risk assessments specific to their force that consider the risks of radicalisation to terrorism, and the level and type of risk will indicate how often the assessments should be reviewed. Forces should work with Counter Terrorism Policing to produce CTLPs. CTLPs should be informed by and shared with local

authorities and other statutory partners. [Guidance on CTLPs](#) is available on GOV.UK. [\[footnote 103\]](#)

261. Each police force should have an action plan, based on a risk assessment, to ensure that risks to their force are being managed appropriately. There should be policies in place to deal with radicalisation concerns, and processes to advise how concerns should be handled.

262. When someone at risk of radicalisation is identified, the police will undertake receipt and triaging of Prevent referrals and consider appropriate interventions.

263. Receipt and triaging of Prevent referrals determines whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism, and therefore may be appropriate for support through Channel. This 'gateway assessment' draws on police databases and other resources to determine the level of susceptibility, risk, and whether there are any other underlying vulnerabilities for the referred person, and whether the referral will move into (or out of) Prevent. The police will consider whether the person referred may be at risk of escalating towards participating in acts of terrorism or otherwise engaging in terrorism-related activity, if left unaddressed by authorities.

264. The police will consider appropriate interventions in partnership with other agencies, including the local authority. The primary route for people identified as being at risk of radicalisation is support through local authority-led, multi-agency Channel panels. People who the police reasonably suspect to pose a serious or imminent risk of terrorism offending are unlikely to be signposted for support through Channel, with their risk instead being managed through other police interventions. The police will consider the best way to manage someone's risk of becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism.

Sharing information

265. Police should ensure they comply with the applicable requirements of data protection legislation.

Reducing permissive environments

266. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Reducing permissive environments](#).

267. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, can help reduce the risk of people from becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives. [\[footnote 104\]](#)

268. Police should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism.

269. Specified authorities are expected to comply with the Prevent duty. Aligning with, or seeking advice from, people or organisations who encourage non-compliance with the statutory duty could undermine this or contribute to an environment permissive of radicalisation to terrorism.

270. When seeking advice and participation from people or groups, it is recommended that police consider what level of due diligence is appropriate and whether engagement could confer legitimacy on narratives and ideologies which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as those used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Police forces should understand the risks of engaging with people or groups who have been associated with terrorist organisations, or whose views have been linked to terrorism. We recommend forces do their own due diligence and consult with Counter Terrorism Policing to understand risks.

271. The police have a critical role in helping communities build their resilience to radicalising influences and extremist ideologies. They should do this by:

- supporting local authority Prevent Co-ordinators or leads in developing Prevent-related projects and action plans to help build community resilience
- supporting the Charity Commission by, for example, offering guidance to avoid money being inadvertently given to organisations which may endorse extremism or terrorism, and enforcing legislation where offences such as fraud are identified
- collating and analysing community tension reporting across the UK that enables police and partners to identify and respond to emerging concerns
- meeting the Strategic Policing Requirement of supporting opportunities to, where appropriate, develop community challenges to extremists and disrupt radicalising and extremist activity which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as spreading narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism, in partnership with other specified authorities – this should focus on disrupting such

activity in this country, alongside lawfully disrupting or tackling such material and activity on the internet

272. Officers should consider the full range of investigative and prosecution options when it comes to disrupting radicalisers and those who espouse extremist narratives which inspire people to support terrorism, including the use of public order powers where appropriate. This may include:

- enforcing terrorism and public order legislation – for example, offences concerning support of a proscribed (terrorist) organisation
- working with local authorities to consider municipal powers, including local highways and leafleting by-laws, and ensuring the safeguarding of young people
- providing high visibility police presence at relevant events in public places
- providing advice to other specified authorities – for example, local authorities or universities

Monitoring and assurance

273. This section should be read alongside Section 4: [Monitoring and assurance](#).

274. The [Strategic Policing Requirement](#) (SPR) makes clear that Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Chief Constables must demonstrate that they have contributed to the government's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST).^{[[footnote 105](#)]} This includes Prevent, where the requirements include maintaining Prevent capabilities such as the ability to gather and assess Prevent referrals. The SPR also requires Chief Constables to develop local partnerships to deliver projects to protect people from radicalisation and support opportunities to develop community challenges to extremists who use narratives which could encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. The Home Secretary can direct a PCC to take specific action to address a specific failure.

275. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) is the statutory body for inspecting the police. They can carry out thematic inspections and can be asked to inspect a particular force or theme by the Home Secretary.

Criminal justice agencies (prisons and probation)

276. As an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice, His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) is responsible for protecting the public and reducing reoffending through delivery of prison and probation services. HMPPS is responsible for people serving a sentence in prison, remanded in custody or under probation supervision, subject either to community sentences or to licence conditions following release from custody.

277. The responsibility for public protection and reducing reoffending gives HMPPS a clear and important role, both in working with people convicted of terrorism or terrorism-connected offences, and in preventing other people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

278. HMPPS manages the risk of people being drawn into, or reverting to, any form of offending as part of its core business (identifying and managing the risks presented by them).

279. Youth Offending Teams are part of the local authority and are separate from the police and the courts. They work with young people who get into trouble with the law, looking into the background of a young person to try to help them stay away from criminal activity. They work in conjunction with the police, probation officers, health, housing and children's services, schools and education authorities, charities, and the local community.

Specified authorities

280. The specified authorities listed in [Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 \(CTSA 2015\)](#) in the field of criminal justice are as follows^{[[footnote 106](#)]}:

- the governor of a prison in England and Wales (or, in the case of a contracted-out prison, its director)
- the governor of a young offender institution or secure training centre (or, in the case of a contracted-out young offender institution or secure training centre, its director)

- the principal of a secure college
- a provider of probation services within the meaning given by Section 3(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007

Leadership and partnership

281. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Leadership and partnership](#).

282. Leadership can be demonstrated by ensuring there are capabilities to deal with concerns linked to radicalisation, terrorist risk behaviours and managing those individuals convicted of terrorist offences, and that staff understand the role they play in countering terrorism.

283. The HMPPS Joint Extremism Unit provides operational leadership at a national and regional level to ensure processes are in place for identifying, assessing and managing people at risk of being radicalised into terrorism or those convicted of terrorism offences.

284. Senior leaders in the Probation Service regions, the National Security Division and prison governors will also provide leadership in this area. Every probation region should have a designated Probation Counter-Terrorism Lead to provide the leadership necessary at a regional level to ensure processes are in place and followed for identifying, assessing and managing people at risk of being radicalised into terrorism or convicted of terrorist offences.

285. Effective partnership can be demonstrated by engaging appropriately where required with other partners, such as the police and Prevent leads in local authorities. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in operational delivery and best practice.

286. In all partnership working, we expect that all providers of prison and probation services will comply with the Prevent duty. For example, HMPPS is a partner in local Prevent boards and appropriate Prevent working groups. Active participation in Prevent meetings will enable all prison and probation providers to work together with other partners to share information and develop relationships, strategy and local partnerships.

287. HMPPS will seek to manage risks posed by those convicted of terrorist offences and those individuals who are assessed as posing a terrorist risk through multi-agency meetings held within the prison and community, at which key partners will be present.

288. For people already convicted of terrorist offences, HMPPS will lead and contribute to appropriate processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) with input from other agencies as required. These processes ensure that the requirements of the Prevent duty are met in the management of terrorist offenders in the community with the Probation Service and police as the lead agencies in MAPPA for such cases.

289. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, criminal justice agencies must co-operate with local authority-led Channel panels, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Multi-agency involvement in Channel is essential to make the full range of information accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

Capabilities

290. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Capabilities](#).

Understanding risk

Training and induction

291. In complying with the Prevent duty, training should be provided to staff at the earliest opportunity to ensure they are adequately equipped for their role.

292. All staff, including senior leaders, should have regular training on terrorist risk based on concrete examples. They should also complete any mandatory training as required by HMPPS. This can be supplemented by the recommended [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#).^[footnote 107] Those with Prevent-specific responsibilities should support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published [Prevent referral statistics](#), emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials.^[footnote 108]

293. Specified authorities should conduct a risk assessment to understand the risks relating to radicalisation to terrorism in their circumstances. This should inform training requirements, including how often training is reviewed and refreshed.

Prisons

294. In complying with the Prevent duty, all new prison staff should receive Prevent awareness training (tailored specifically to the prison environment). For staff already in post, this should be provided through specialist training and briefing packages that cover working with extremist behaviour. All staff should understand the terrorist risk and threat, and how to recognise, report and respond to it. Training should cover intelligence systems used to report concerns to enable them to report on people susceptible to radicalisation and terrorist risk behaviours.

295. The regional Prison Counter Terrorism teams lead on the delivery of the counter-terrorism training package (face-to-face or remote delivery) and specific threat modules for regional variations.

Probation

296. For probation staff, mandatory Prevent training required by HMPPS can be accessed through the [HMPPS myLearning platform](#) and should be completed every three years for all members of staff.

297. In addition, regional Probation Counter Terrorism teams lead on the delivery of the HMPPS counter-terrorism training package (face-to-face or remote delivery) and specific threat modules for regional variations. Probation Counter Terrorism Leads work with Probation Delivery Units to facilitate professional development sessions to newly qualified officers and frontline staff as appropriate and dependant on need.

298. In complying with the Prevent duty, we expect this and other relevant Prevent training to continue.

Under-18 secure estate

299. HMPPS's Regional Counter-Terrorism teams provide specialist advice and support to all Youth Custody Service sites.

300. We expect staff at each secure estate and Youth Offending Teams overseeing the care of the child or young person to receive appropriate training in identifying and managing those at risk of becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

301. All newly recruited staff into young offender institutions attend the same prison officer apprenticeship as their adult estate counterparts. This includes counter-terrorism training (face-to-face or remote delivery) delivered by the regional Prison Counter-Terrorism teams. All staff working within Secure Training Centres and Secure Children Homes receive mandatory counter-terrorism training as part of their training and induction.

302. As part of the ongoing care and monitoring of each child or young person, any indication of terrorism-related risks, needs or susceptibilities should be identified. Contact should be made with HMPPS's Regional Counter Terrorism team to determine the appropriate course of action.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

303. Specified authorities must ensure there are processes in place to manage risks both to and from those susceptible to being radicalised into terrorism, as well as to and from those posing a terrorism risk or those who have been convicted of terrorist offences.

304. Assessing the risk posed by offenders is complex. Engagement in risk reduction programmes or interventions does not, in itself, indicate a reduction in risk. Where the outward behaviour of offenders indicates a reduction in risk, there must also be evidence that the change has been internalised for an assessment of sincere change to be made. Even when sincere change has been assessed, an individual's risk is dynamic. It is liable to change over time and due to changes in circumstance (including the move from custody to the community). Therefore, a strong precautionary principle should be applied. Risk assessments should be conducted regularly by specialist practitioners over an extended period.

Prisons

305. As well as having overall risk assessments for each institution, HMPPS should be assessing the risks to and from people. Prisons should perform initial risk assessments on reception, including cell-sharing risk assessments, and initial reception and induction interviews to establish concerns in relation to any form of radicalisation or terrorism.

306. Contact with prison chaplaincy takes place as an integral part of the induction process. Any concerns raised through chaplaincy contact with prisoners, including any concerns about radicalisation or vulnerability, should be reported then and throughout the sentence.

307. Where concerns around someone being radicalised into terrorism (which includes someone convicted of any offence, who is considered to present a risk of committing an act of terrorism or is otherwise potentially susceptible to terrorist offending) are identified, prison staff should report them accordingly through the intelligence reporting system. All such reporting should be regularly assessed by specialist counter-terrorism staff in conjunction with the police. Action should be taken to support and challenge the person as appropriate, using local tactical and specialist resources as

required. Prison Counter-Terrorism teams should be consulted by staff if there are concerns that someone is being radicalised.

308. Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, for example with law enforcement partners, to understand whether radicalisation is an issue and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern.

Assessing ongoing risk and interventions

309. For people convicted of terrorist or terrorist-connected offences, mainstream offender management processes should be used to determine whether interventions are necessary. These are intended to challenge the index offence and can include, where appropriate, providing interventions.

310. Where such concerns are identified, an establishment should look to support that person. There are many intervention or disruption techniques that can be applied, including moving them away from a negative influence, providing them with mentoring, or referring them to one of the services offered by HMPPS or the Home Office. This will use local tactical and specialist resources as required and may trigger referrals to counter-terrorism rehabilitation programmes.

311. Management actions could also include a reduction in privilege level, anti-bullying intervention, adjudication or segregation. Separation centres are available for the specialised management of the most subversive terrorist or terrorist risk prisoners, which are those who present a level of risk that makes placement within a separation centre desirable, to prevent them from spreading their malicious ideology to others. It may also be appropriate to provide theological, motivational and behavioural interventions.

312. Intelligence and briefing packages targeted at staff working with prisoners at risk of becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, as well as those convicted for terrorist-connected offences, should be made available. These should be jointly delivered by appropriately trained prison staff and should be updated as required.

Probation

313. We expect probation staff to adopt an investigative stance in undertaking risk assessments, as they should in all cases, and be alert to instances of dishonesty. Where there are concerns about someone being radicalised, staff should consult and receive support from the specialist Probation Counter Terrorism team network to incorporate these concerns into HMPPS's core risk assessment tool called OASys. Further assessment will then be undertaken as to whether specialist assessments and interventions are required.

314. Most terrorist offenders and those otherwise assessed as presenting high levels of terrorist risk will be managed by the National Security Division, a unit of the Probation Service which provides enhanced monitoring and specialist case management. For others on probation assessed as posing a terrorist risk, their supervision period will be supervised by Probation Service regions with support from the Probation Counter Terrorism team.

315. Planning for supervision should take place for everyone, including those carrying out community sentences. Consideration should be given to what risks need to be managed in the community, including those that have arisen while in custody (for those individuals who have served a custodial sentence) and indicate a susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism. Where this is the case, specialist interventions and assessments will be considered as part of the risk management plans. This may include completing a Prevent referral in relevant cases. Where this is assessed as an appropriate response, this should be made at the earliest opportunity by the Probation Counter Terrorism team, and the Prevent [national referral form](#) should be used. [\[footnote 109\]](#)

316. For people already convicted of terrorist offences, HMPPS will contribute to appropriate pre-release processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) led by the police and National Security Division of the Probation Service, with input from other agencies as required. These processes ensure that the requirements of the Prevent duty are met in the management of terrorist offenders in the community, with HMPPS as the lead agency in MAPPA for such cases.

317. For people already convicted of terrorist offences, we expect the Probation Service to work in partnership with other agencies, including prisons and the police, to manage any risks identified via MAPPA and to provide bespoke interventions where relevant. For people who have not been convicted of a terrorist offence and may not be MAPPA-eligible, but who are assessed as at risk of being radicalised into terrorism, we expect HMPPS to have processes in place to escalate these cases to other agencies or otherwise refer the person for appropriate interventions. For example, they may be referred to the Channel programme. There may be other options for risk management which are more suitable, depending on local and regional provision.

Under-18 secure estate

318. Youth custodial establishments are under the Prevent duty and children in their custody should be safeguarded from the risk of participating in or supporting terrorism. Capability reviews, which assess all aspects of provision, are regularly conducted in the youth secure estate. The small number of risks are managed in a highly tailored manner with particular focus on rehabilitation.

Sharing information

319. Specified authorities must ensure that they act in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation. It may be good practice to have information sharing agreements in place for some sharing of personal data.

Reducing permissive environments

320. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, [Reducing permissive environments](#).

321. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers and the platforms they seek to use, as well as extremist narratives and content which can be reasonably linked to terrorism, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism. [GOV.UK Prevent duty training](#) provides further information on extremist narratives. [\[footnote 110\]](#)

322. Disrupting radicalisers, who create a permissive environment for violence and spread poisonous ideologies that undermine our values and our society, can help to prevent people from being radicalised into terrorism. This may mean having policies in place that, where appropriate, limit radicalising influences, such as by using separation centres or identifying and removing materials, including books, magazines and audio CDs, that could be used to spread harmful, radicalising ideology. It could mean empowering staff to challenge extremist ideas that can be reasonably linked to a terrorist ideology, some of which encompass more broadly harmful ideas, such as misogyny and antisemitism. It is also important that Prevent funding does not go to organisations or people, including intervention providers, who are linked to terrorism or whose extremist ideas are used to legitimise terrorism. Due diligence should be carried out to assess such risk accordingly.

Monitoring and assurance

323. This section should be read alongside Section 4: [Monitoring and assurance](#).

324. As with all specified authorities, where there is clear evidence of non-compliance with the duty, the Home Office may recommend that the Secretary of State use the power of direction under Section 30 of the CTSA 2015. This power would only be used

when other options for engagement and improvement have been exhausted. It can also be exercised in respect of Welsh and Scottish specified authorities and requires the Secretary of State to consult the Welsh ministers or Scottish ministers respectively before giving such a direction.

Prisons

325. Within prisons, we expect compliance with the Prevent duty to be monitored and enforced internally by:

- mandatory compliance with policy frameworks which define policy and best practice
- regular assessment of levels and risk of extremism and radicalisation internally via regional counter-terrorism leads and locally via Prison Prevent Leads

Probation

326. For probation providers, internally, compliance with the Prevent duty is enforced by the managing extremism policy framework. Compliance with Probation instructions is monitored and assured internally by contract management and audit functions within HMPPS and the Ministry of Justice.

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